Abstract-This paper extends the weak secrecy results of'Liu et al. f'or broadcast channels with two confidential messages to strong secrecy. Our results are based on an extension of' the techniques developed by Hou and Kramer on bounding KullbackLeibler divergence in the context of' resolvability and effective secrecy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Based on the pioneering work of Shannon [1], Wyner [2] determined the secrecy capacity of a class of wiretap channels. Wyner's work has been generalized by Csiszar and Korner [3] to the non-degraded broadcast channel with a single confidential message for one user and a common message intended for both users. The confidential message has to be kept secret from the other user, while both of them decode the common message. A variant of Csiszar and Korner's model with two confidential messages and no common message was first studied by Liu et al. in [4] for a discrete memoryless channel and later for the Gaussian case in [5] . Inner and outer bounds on the secrecy region can be found in [4] .
The secrecy criterion used in [2] [3] [4] , is the normalized mutual information between the message and the output distribution of the user regarded as the eavesdropper. This security criterion, called weak secrecy, delivers a very restricted security against eavesdropping attacks as was shown by Maurer in [6] . An unnormalized definition of secrecy, called strong secrecy, was proposed in [6] and large parts of previous work was extended from the weak to strong secrecy (e.g. [6] , [7] , [8] , and, etc.). In this paper we extend the inner bound of [4] to the strong secrecy. Our method of proof is based on even stronger notion of effective secrecy that was introduced by Hou and Kramer [9] and Han, Endo, and Sasaki [10] . A clear operational interpretation of effective secrecy is given in [9] . More precisely we prove, in addition to strong secrecy, that stealthy communication (i.e. the presence of meaningful communication is hidden) is possible. I.e. in the setting of broadcast channel with confidential messages we show that in addition to preventing receiver 2 (1) from decoding the We present detailed proofs in the extended versions of this work. message sent to receiver 1 (2) it is also possible to prevent the receiver 2 (1) from detecting that a message has been sent to receiver 1 (2). The proof method of [9] has to be complemented by a result (Lemma 2 in our paper) that takes care of the specific structure of the construction of the code book in [11] .
A. Notation
We use capital letters for random variables (RV). If X is a RV then x is used to refer to an realization of X. Sets are denoted by calligraphic letters, e.g. X. The cardinality of a set X is denoted as IXI. P(X) denotes the set of probability distributions defined on the (finite) set X. Probability mass function of X is Px(x) or in short P(x) while probability of an event E is denoted by Pr(E). The Kullback-Leibler divergence of two probability distributions P, Q defined on set A is given by
where P « Q means that P(a) = 0 whenever Q(a) = 0 a E A. The typical set of sequences xn E xn for RV X and E > 0 is denoted by T;n (Px ) as defined in [12] . We will freely use the properties of typical sets from [12] . II . SYSTEM MODEL We consider a broadcast scenario consisting of a sender (S) and two receivers. We assume that all channels are discrete memoryless with finite input alphabet X, and finite output alphabets Yl and Y2. The conditional probability distribution governing the discrete memory less broadcast channel (DM-BCC) is given by Proof" The proof, which consists of two parts, achievability and secrecy, unfolds in the following subsections. The achievablity proof is based on techniques developed in [11, 13] and extends those devoted to secrecy developed in [9] for the wiretap channel to the present setting. (7) where the RVs WI and W2 are distributed uniformly over Ml and M2, respectively, and the mutual information values are computed with respect to the distribution
with the stochastic encoder given in (3).
The probability of error at each node t E {I, 2} is Remark 2: In order to simplify our notation we will drop the auxiliary random variable U in the following proof. It can be included into the proof via standard arguments [14, 15] Let 0 < f < f' < f". For (ml, m2) and (81,82) find a pair
If there is no such a pair choose (k 1 , k2 ) = (1, 1). Then select a sequence x(ml' m2, 81, 82) E xn with (VI (ml, 81, kI), V2(m2, 82, k2 ), x(ml, m2, 81, 82)) E ~r;(pVl V2X). Remark 1: The above definition provides a strong condition on security. More details are given in section III-C where we show that even stronger notion of secrecy based on stealth can be achieved.
III. STRONG SECRECY FOR BROADCAST CHANNELS
In this section we present an achievable secure rate region with strong secrecy criterion for a DMBCC. The following theorem summarizes our results: 
B. Error Analysis
The error analysis is carried out using standard arguments. Using the mutual covering lemma, packing lemma, and the properties of the typical sequences (cf. for example [12] ) we obtain Rl + R~ + Rco < I(Vl; Yd· (9) t E {I, 2} exponentially fast. From (9) and by symmetry, we have Rt + R~ < I(vt; yt) -~I(Vl; V2), t E {I, 2} (10) The bounds on R~ and R; are derived in the following subsection.
[The cardinalities of U, VI, V2 can be bounded by the Ahlswede-Korner technique. We shall provide this in the journal version of this manuscript C. Strong Secrecy Criterion Remark 3: For the secrecy analysis we drop the random variable U for the sake of notational simplicity. If desired it can be introduced via standard arguments at the end of the proof [3, 9] .
Before we continue, we define a deterministic function ¢T 
In the case that there are many such pairs, we choose one arbitrarily. However, if there are no such pairs, the function ¢T returns (1,1) . From now on, we denote the codeword pairs simply (V1 (m1, 31), V2 (nL2, 32)) based on selection function
¢T'
We extend the framework in [9, 16] to find a condition on
Ri and R~ that allows us to show that
holds, where ~ > 0 is arbitrarily small. The left hand side of (12) and Q~2!V2 (Y2I v 2) := L PV, (vd P;2!V,,vJY2I v 1, V2) (13) v, with the convention that for V2 = V2 (m2, 82) the notation Q~21v2 is understood as
We can further expand (12) as
where we used that PY2 !V2(Y2I v 2) = Lml P(rn1,Y2Iv2).
Remark 4: The expansion in (15) , reveals that (12) addresses not only the strong secrecy notation by bounding I(W1; y 2n IV2), but also bounds D(PY2Iv21IQ~2Iv2) which corresponds to stealth of the communication. The latter quantity measures how close the actual distribution that receiver 2 observes is to the distribution receiver 2 would expect to observe if the transmitter was not sending a meaningful message to receiver 1. We refer to [9] for the operational significance and interpretation of stealth.
Based on chain rule for informational divergence we have,
where, according to the definition of D('II') in (1), the first term on the right-hand side of (16) 1,1) )(-n)log(1fQY21V2) ::.; Tne> (19) for all sufficiently large n, where II ( .) is the indicator function. The last inequality comes from the mutual covering lemma (cf.
[12] for example), where Q > 0 is a constant independent of n. With (16) Hence, in the following we focus on bounding the first term in the right hand side of (20) . We take the expectation over the y 2 n, {Vt(m1, 3d : 'rn1 = 1, .. . lvI1, 31 = 1, ... , J1}, W 1 and Sl for a fixed realization of V2nCm2, 82) = v2, we obtain
JIQ~2Iv2 (y2 n lv2 )
hQ~2!V2 (y2 n lv2 ) (22) where, in (21) we used Jensen's inequality applied to the part of the expectation over V l n (ml, i) for i of-81. 2.
Before proceeding with the bounds on the informational divergence, we introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 2: Let
PVI ,v2,Y2(Y2,V2,VI) PVI,v2 (VI, V2)PY2 !VI,v2 (Y2Ivl, V2) be a probability distribution
on Y2 x VI X V2. For E E (0, ~) and distribution where, 61 (E) > 0 with limE--+o 61 (E) = O. Moreover, 
ID(P V2 ,y 2 1IPv 2 Q) -D(PV2
D(P V2 ,y 2 1IPv 2 Q) (29) = L PV2,Y2(v2,Y2)logPv2,Y2(v2,Y2) V2,Y2 -L PV2,Y2(v2,Y2)logPv2(v2) V2,Y2 -L P V2 ,y 2 (v2,Y2)logQ(Y2I v2) Q(Y2I v2) := L PVI (vI)PY2 !VI,vJY2I vl, V2)(23)
V2,Y2
VI and applying again the uniform continuity of entropy along with the properties of typical sequences we obtain (27).
it holds for (V2, Y2) E ~n(pV2,YJ that
Qn(Y2I v 2) ::;:, T n(H(Y2!V2)+I(VI;V2)+b(C))
To finish the proof we need to show D(PV2 ,y 2 1IPv 2 Q) < (24) I(Vl, V2) which can be derived as follows, with 6(E) > 0 and limE--+o 6(E) = O.
Proo!' According to Lemma 2.6 in [14] we have for all (Y2 , V2 ), (25) where, I ) P V2 ,Y 2 denotes the empirical distribution or type of the sequence pair (V2, Y2) 2) P V2 is the empirical distribution generated by the sequence V2 3) the distribution P V2 Q is the joint distribution computed with respect to P V2 and Q 
Qn(Y2I v 2) = Tn(H(PY2,Y2)-H(PY2)+D(PY2,Y21IPY2Q))
2 A detailed proof of this derivation is due to journal version of this work
where, (30) is by the Log-Sum-Inequality (Lemma 3.1 in [14] 
2-n(H(Y2!VI ,v2)-,h (E))
log J I 2- (10) , we obtain the rate region as in the
n (H(Y2!V2)+I(VI ;V2)+02 (E))

2-n(H(VI)+I(VI;
V2
